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Abstract
This study introduces the concept of “compound games” and investigates whether the decom-
position of a game – when implemented – influences behaviour. For example, we investigate
whether separating battle of the sexes games into a pure coordination component and the re-
maining battle of the sexes component changes coordination success. The literature attributes
high coordination rates in pure coordination games with focal points to team reasoning and low
coordination rates in related battle of the sexes games to level-k reasoning. We find that coor-
dination success in compound games depends on the decomposition and order of component
games.
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1 Introduction
Consider the battle of the sexes game between a Bach admirer and a Stravinsky enthusiast regarding
the evening entertainment on 21 March 2021. “Their main concern is to go out together, but
one person prefers Bach and the other person prefers Stravinsky” (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994,
p. 15). It is common knowledge that the evening happens to be on Bach’s 336th birthday, which
makes the Bach event salient. In experiments, such saliency enables high levels of coordination in
pure coordination games (PC), however, its effectiveness is severely reduced in battle of the sexes
games. In this paper, we ask whether the coordination success of the two music devotees can be
increased by emphasising the pure coordination element of the game “to go out together”?
We investigate this question with the help of the new concept of “compound games”, which
formalises the implementation of games in their decomposed state. A decomposition splits a simple
game into multiple additive component games with strategy spaces identical to the simple game’s
strategy space. A compound game consists of these multiple component games and additional rules
needed to study behaviour in its implementation. Specifically, across component games, players
have to choose identical strategies so that, theoretically, a compound game and its original game
are equivalent. Because of its different framing, compound games might elicit different behaviour
and can offer insights beyond the study of standard games.
In recent years, various game decompositions have been introduced to the literature (Candogan,
Menache, Ozdaglar and Parrilo, 2011; Kalai and Kalai, 2013; Jessie and Saari, 2016; Demuynck,
Seel and Tran, 2019). These decompositions have been mostly used for theoretical and diagnos-
tical purposes, such as quantifying the competitiveness of a game (Demuynck et al., 2019). To
our knowledge, we are the first to empirically study behaviour in what we call compound games.
Closest to our study, Jessie and Kendall (2020) experimentally investigate behaviour in individ-
ual component games. We investigate behaviour in compound games in which, by contrast, all
component games of a decomposition are implemented.
Table 1 shows one of many possible decompositions of a battle of the sexes game (BS ) into
a compound game pc + bs consisting of a pure coordination component (pc) and the remaining
battle of the sexes component (bs). For this “mixed-motive game”, as Schelling (1960, p. 89) calls
a BS game, this decomposition formally separates the motive “to go out together” from the second
motive that “one person prefers Bach and the other person prefers Stravinsky”.
B S B S B S
B 11, 10 0, 0
=
B 4, 4 0, 0
+
B 7, 6 0, 0
S 0, 0 10, 11 S 0, 0 4, 4 S 0, 0 6, 7
Table 1: Decomposition of BS game into compound game pc + bs.
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In contrast to a compound game, we call “Cartesian game” the implementation of multiple
component games without the mentioned choice restrictions. They thus reflect the simultaneous
engagement of players in multiple independent games.
The specific decompositions we study here are motivated by the possibility to formally reflect a
game’s set of motives and possibly its verbal and even mental representation. Further decomposi-
tions might be empirically interesting; decompositions by strategies to study equilibrium selection
or random decompositions to study the scope of decompositions’ behavioural relevance. Com-
pound games bear the potential to analyse the effect of game decomposition on behaviour. Jessie
and Saari (2019) discuss specific decompositions as mathematical “coordinate systems for games”.
Similarly, compound games can help to identify individual game components that are elementary
in terms of behaviour and reasoning. Generally, any decomposition implemented in a compound
game – in practice a mere re-framing of the original game – raises the question of whether be-
haviour will be affected.
In our application, this question translates into whether a more explicit framing of the two
motives increases or decreases the coordination success. Also, given that the two motives are
separated, does the order of presentation or a possible sequence of presentation matter? In other
words, is the game play influenced by the nature of the first or second component game rather
than the original simple game? Would it matter that the second component is only visible after a
provisional choice in the first? Furthermore, given that the decomposition is not unique and that a
different common interest component could be separated, does the size of the separated pc payoff
influence the success of coordination?
Experimental evidence shows that in pure coordination games payoff-irrelevant salient features
– such as Bach’s birthday – allow players to coordinate with a success rate higher than predicted
by random choice (Mehta et al., 1994; Bardsley et al., 2010; Isoni et al., 2013; Sitzia and Zheng,
2019). This success is commonly explained with the theory of team reasoning, which is based
on Schelling’s (1960) theory of focal points, and postulates that players look for a selection rule
that maximises the chances of coordination when all act in line with that rule (Sugden, 1995;
Bacharach, 2006). In recent years, this literature has furthermore established that this success is
severely reduced in battle of the sexes games due to the players’ conflicts of interest. The frequent
mis-coordination is attributed to level-k reasoning, in which label or payoff salience shape level-0
players’ behaviour (Crawford et al., 2008; van Elten and Penczynski, 2020; Isoni et al., 2020).
Our results show that the game decomposition has an influence on behaviour. Coordination
success in compound games increases if a pc component game is presented first and decreases
when the first game is a bs. Decomposing a simple PC game into two bs components reduces
coordination success significantly. Even in Cartesian games, a bs component game reduces the
coordination success in the subsequent pc component game.
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In terms of concepts and results, some analogies exist between compound games and com-
pound lotteries. The nature of our results relates our study to the literature on narrow bracketing
and behavioural spillovers. Decomposing a game gives rise to the possibility that players narrow
bracket if they consider component games in isolation and fail to see the compound game as a
whole (Read, Loewenstein, Rabin, Keren and Laibson, 1999). Like the literature finds narrow
bracketing in independent lottery choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; Rabin and Weizsäcker,
2009), we find narrow bracketing in strategy choices in Cartesian games. Surprisingly, while
the compound games’ strategy space highlights the simultaneous relevance of the two component
games, the effects of narrow bracketing are even stronger than in the Cartesian games. Behavioural
spillovers imply that the adoption of one behaviour causes another related behaviour (Bednar et
al., 2012). We see interesting asymmetric spillovers as a bs component influences a following pc
component much more than vice versa.
While simple games can summarise concisely multiple aspects of strategic situations, com-
pound games formally capture aspects of a framing that might arise naturally in the interaction.
For example, complex negotiations such as the Brexit negotiations or the US-China trade nego-
tiations will naturally be considered by topic before parties come to an overall agreement. The
behavioural consequences of this framing are shown to be significant and relevant.
2 Cartesian, compound and reduced games
Our study requires a new and suitable terminology to describe details of the implementation of
a decomposition. Due to the analogies with compound and reduced lotteries we align our terms
where possible.
In line with the literature, we consider a decomposition to be the expression of a game’s payoff
matrix g as the sum of component game payoff matrices of the same size, g = c1+c2+c3+. . .+ck. As
a starting point, we establish the simple game1 as the elementary basis for further manipulations.
Definition 1 (Simple game) A simple game G consists of a finite set of players i ∈ N and a strat-
egy space S =

i S i. The preferences of player i are represented by a payoff function pii : S → R.
A A
A 11, 10 0, 0
A 0, 0 10, 11
Table 2: A simple 2-player BS (11, 10) with S i = {A, A}.
1In cooperative game theory, games that feature only payoffs of 0 or 1 are called simple games. Here, we merely
want to distinguish a game from a compound game.
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The most basic way of formalising play of multiple games is to represent the simultaneous play
of a number of simple games in what we call a Cartesian game. Cartesian games have occasionally
been implemented in the experimental literature but not formally defined (e.g. Bland, 2019); they
are natural auxiliary games in this study of compound games.2
Definition 2 (Cartesian game) A Cartesian game Γ consists of a totally ordered set of k simul-
taneously played simple component games, all of which feature the same finite set of players
i ∈ N. Each component game c features a strategy space S c and payoff functions for player i,
pici : S
c → R.
Table 3 presents an example of a Cartesian game. Generally, we denote component games in
lowercase as pc and bs, respectively. A Cartesian game with two pc component games is denoted
by pc × pc, where the first term refers to component 1 and the second to component 2. In order to
be able to distinguish a pc× bs game from a bs× pc game with identical component games – as is
necessary in any implementation – the definition uses a totally ordered set of c components.
a b α β
a 7, 6 0, 0 × α 4, 4 0, 0
b 0, 0 6, 7 β 0, 0 4, 4
Table 3: Cartesian game bs × pc (7, 6 × 4, 4).











i : Σ→ R, as table 4 illustrates.
aα aβ bα bβ
aα 11, 10 7, 6 4, 4 0, 0
aβ 7, 6 11, 10 0, 0 4, 4
bα 4, 4 0, 0 10, 11 6, 7
bβ 0, 0 4, 4 6, 7 10, 11
Table 4: Reduced form of Cartesian game bs × pc (7, 6 × 4, 4).
In contrast to the way in which a Cartesian game relates to its component games, all decom-
positions in the literature as well as our experimental design feature the same strategy space in the
component games as in the reduced game. Furthermore, the strategies for the different component
2Our concept of Cartesian game nests two concepts commonly referred to as “supergame”. In the study of repeated
games, a “supergame” refers to a possibly infinite number of sequential repetitions of a simple stage game, which is
a sequential version of a Cartesian game with identical component games. In experimental economics, the term
“supergame” is often used to emphasise the ensemble of games in an experimental session, in which participants play
more than one game – be it simultaneously or sequentially – and which might therefore feature additional unintended
strategic considerations beyond the individual component games.
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games are not meant to be chosen independently by players, but rather are set to be the same across
all component games. It is therefore useful to define a compound game as follows.
Definition 3 (Compound game) A compound game C consists of a totally ordered set of k simul-
taneously played simple component games, all of which feature identical sets of players N and
strategy spaces S . The chosen strategy s ∈ S is constrained to be the same across all component
games. Each component game c features payoff functions for player i, pici : S → R.
Table 5 gives an example of a compound game. A compound game with two pc component
games is denoted pc + pc. In the reduced form of a compound game, for each player and each





Table 6 shows the exemplary reduced compound game.
a b a b
a 7, 6 0, 0
+
a 4, 4 0, 0
b 0, 0 6, 7 b 0, 0 4, 4
Table 5: Compound game bs + pc (7, 6 + 4, 4).
aa bb
aa 11, 10 0, 0
bb 0, 0 10, 11
Table 6: Reduced form of the compound game bs + pc (7, 6 + 4, 4).
3 Literature
3.1 Decompositions
The last 10 years have seen the emergence of a sizeable set of theoretical studies that propose
decompositions of games mostly for theoretical and diagnostical purposes. With two exceptions,
these have not been used for empirical investigations of behaviour as we propose here.
Candogan et al. (2011) introduce a flow representation of finite games in strategic form, which
is used to decompose an arbitrary game into its potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components.
A game is said to be a “potential” game if the incentive of all players to change their strategy can
be expressed with a single global function called the potential function (Monderer and Shapley,
1996).
In a prominent contribution, Kalai and Kalai (2013) decompose any 2-player game with finitely
many strategies into a competitive zero-sum game and a cooperative common-interest game. They
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use the decomposition to define a semi-cooperative solution, the coco value, for games with trans-
ferable utility.
Demuynck et al. (2019) extend this decomposition to games with an arbitrary number of players
and an infinite strategy space. With an appropriate metric, they define the normed distance between
any game and its cooperative component as the competitiveness-cooperativeness index (CCI). In
the empirical part of the paper, they show that the competitiveness of behaviour in experimental
games is on average in line with the CCI.
Jessie and Saari (2016, 2019) introduce a unique decomposition of n-player, binary strategy
games into three parts, a Nash, a behavioural and a Kernel (non-strategic) part, see figure 7 for an
example.3 One main contribution of this decomposition is the reduction of complexity in the anal-
ysis of a game. Building on this decomposition, Jessie and Kendall (2020) show experimentally
that the invariance to the behavioural and non-strategic part – which many equilibrium concepts
and models of strategic thinking feature – is not observed empirically. Kendall (2020) uses the
behavioural part of the decomposition to improve predictions for one-shot and repeated stag-hunt
games.
B S B S B S B S
B 8, 4 0, 0
=
B 4, 2 −2,−2
+
B 1, −1 −1, −1
+
B 3, 3 3, 3
S 0, 0 4, 8 S −4, −4 2, 4 S 1, 1 −1, 1 S 3, 3 3, 3
Table 7: Decomposition of BS game into Nash, behavioural and Kernel part according to Jessie
and Saari (2019).
3.2 Coordination games with focal points and modes of reasoning
To investigate behaviour in compound games we employ pure coordination and battle of the sexes
games with focal points. These games present interesting case studies because observed behaviour
is found to be sensitive to whether players’ preferences are aligned or conflicting with respect to
which equilibria to coordinate on. No theory, as of yet, is able to fully organise the experimental
evidence of this literature.
Coordination games present a problematic class of games for standard game theory because of
its inability to select one equilibrium out of many. In his seminal work, Schelling (1960) proposes
a theory of focal points in which players are able to concert their expectations on some salient
features of the game (e.g. salient labels attached to strategies) and coordinate on one particular
equilibrium, the focal point of the game. Schelling’s theory has been further developed by Sugden
3The Nash part contains all information to determine a strategic outcome while the behavioural part captures the
game’s aspects that can lead to other kinds of analysis, such as side payments, social preferences, etc.
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(1993) and Bacharach (2006) under the name of team reasoning. These theories assume that play-
ers think of themselves as being part of a team (collective rationality). In Bacharach’s theory, when
players team-reason they ask the question “what should we do” and work out a strategy profile, the
best rule in Sugden’s theory, that leads to the best possible outcome for the team and dictates what
each player should do.
Using a variety of pure coordination games, abundant experimental evidence consistent with
team reasoning has been collected over the years. For example, Mehta et al. (1994) employ a series
of matching games in which subjects are asked to name an object (flower, city, etc.) or to choose
an object out of many. Crawford et al. (2008) find similar results employing a pie game and an
allocation XY-game. The pie game is a two-player game with three pure Nash equilibria while the
allocation game features two. Isoni et al. (2013) use a bargaining table in which players have to
agree on how to share a monetary surplus by making claims on some valuable “discs”.
The promising success of team reasoning theories in explaining behaviour in pure coordination
games however is greatly reduced when players’ interests are not aligned, such as in the battle of
the sexes games. Crawford et al. (2008) develop a model of level-k thinking that is able to explain
the low coordination success observed in these games. This type of reasoning is fundamentally
different and incompatible with team-reasoning, as it implies an individualistic type of reasoning
in which players anchor their beliefs on the behaviour of a player that lacks strategic sophistication,
a level-0 player, and best respond to that.
Since Crawford et al. (2008), attempts have failed to show that team reasoning is the prevalent
mode of reasoning employed across the whole range of coordination games (e.g. Bardsley et al.,
2010; Isoni et al., 2013; Faillo et al., 2017). Empirical evidence shows that individuals seem to
be using both types of reasoning depending on the features of the coordination games. Specifi-
cally, conflicts of interest seem to inhibit team-reasoning and evoke individualistic reasoning while
absence of conflict facilitate collective reasoning (Faillo et al., 2017; van Elten and Penczynski,
2020)
Compound games provide insights that are indicative of the extent to which modes of reasoning
can be influenced and of whether one of the two modes of reasoning is more fragile.
3.3 Narrow bracketing and behavioural spillovers
When facing multiple choices at the same time, individuals often consider each choice in isolation
and fail to appreciate the consequences of those choices collectively. Narrow bracketing is a well-
documented phenomenon in the literature of individual decision-making under risk (Read et al.,
1999). A clear instance is offered in the study by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), later replicated
by Rabin and Weizsäcker (2009). Specifically, from choices between lotteries A and B as well as C
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and D, only 3 percent choose combination BC. Yet, the majority chooses BC over AD when these
lottery pairs are presented in aggregate.
Bland (2019) finds evidence of narrow bracketing in a Cartesian game of two Volunteer’s
dilemmata at the individual but not at the aggregate level. Our study, although not designed as
a controlled test of narrow bracketing, adds clear evidence of this phenomenon in compound and
Cartesian games. Most apparently, in a bs + bs decomposition of a PC game, subjects do not
integrate outcomes because the coordination success is lower than in the PC game.
While the concept of narrow bracketing focuses on the differences between the game and its
decomposed equivalents, the concept of behavioural spillovers considers changes in behaviour in
a game due to games played beforehand or simultaneously.
In an ensemble of games, behavioural spillovers might be the result of a positive transfer of
a principle, rule or strategic behaviour from one game to another one (Knez and Camerer, 2000;
Cooper and Kagel, 2005, 2008; Haruvy and Stahl, 2012; Mengel and Sciubba, 2014). For example,
Cooper and Van Huyck (2018) provide experimental evidence of a transfer of the principle of
dominance from stag-hunt games to order statistic games such as the weak-link or median games.
In the absence of feedback, our study provides an example of asymmetric “rule spillover”. Our
results are in line with the explanation that the mode of strategic reasoning is carried over from bs
to pc components, but not vice versa.
To the extent that these spillovers are inefficient, they can be seen as a type of behavioural
inertia (Bednar et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2019). In these studies on inefficient spillovers, defection is
observed more frequently when the Prisoner’s Dilemma is played with a Self-Interest game than
when it is played in isolation. This literature predominantly observes such inertia from games with
clearly favoured actions to games with more distributed action profiles (Cason et al., 2012). Here,
we see the opposite, as the inertia is most pronounced when moving from the low coordination bs
components to the high coordination pc components.
Once a decomposition is implemented in a compound game, the presentation order of the
component games has to be inevitably defined. This way, permutations of a given decomposition
might lead to different behaviour. In psychology, order effects such as primacy and recency effects
have been studied with respect to elementary cognitive operations such as recall and belief updating
that influence decision-making (Murdock, 1962; Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992).
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4 Experimental design and procedures
4.1 The games
We employ 31 games (simple, compound, and Cartesian) inspired by the XY-game in Crawford et
al. (2008). In this game, two players are required to choose one out of two strategies. Strategies
are labelled by the resulting payoff allocation in the case of coordination. One of the strategies is
made salient by underlining it. If players choose the same strategy then the allocation is enforced,
otherwise they earn nothing. The two choices are presented as follows.
• You receive £a and the other receives £b
• You receive £b and the other receives £a
In a pilot experiment, underlining one of the strategies has proved to be a more powerful cue
for coordination than using X and Y . As simple games, we implemented one PC game, in which
a = b, and two BS games, in which a > b. The payoff matrices for these games are reported in
table 8. In line with the experiment’s framing, the strategies have been labelled as A and A.
A A
A 10, 10 0, 0
A 0, 0 10, 10
(a) PC (10, 10).
A A
A 11, 10 0, 0
A 0, 0 10, 11
(b) BS (11, 10)
A A
A 12, 9 0, 0
A 0, 0 9, 12
(c) BS (12, 9)
Table 8: Implemented simple games.
A A A A A A
A 11, 10 0, 0
=
A 7, 6 0, 0
+
A 4, 4 0, 0
A 0, 0 10, 11 A 0, 0 6, 7 A 0, 0 4, 4
Table 9: Decomposition of BS into compound game bs+pc.
For our purposes, a simple game is decomposed into k = 2 component games, component 1
and component 2. The simple PC game is decomposed either into two PC games (pc + pc) or two
BS games (bs + bs). The simple BS games are decomposed into one pc game and one bs game
(see table 9). Table 10 lists all simple, compound and Cartesian games that we employed.4 We use
4Due to a typo, instead of (4, 4 · 8, 5) our experiment implemented (4, 4 · 7, 5). Since behaviour in these games
is not significantly different from other compound games reducing to the BS (12, 9) game, we expect that this would
have been true for (4, 4 · 8, 5) as well.
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the "·" notation to represent simultaneously the notation "+" and "×" employed for compound and
Cartesian games.
Simple Games Compound/Cartesian games
pc · pc bs · bs pc · bs bs · pc
PC(10, 10)
0, 0 · 10, 10 1, 0 · 9, 10
4, 4 · 6, 6 3, 0 · 7, 10
7, 7 · 3, 3 4, 3 · 6, 7
9, 9 · 1, 1 5, 2 · 5, 8
10, 10 · 0, 0 7, 5 · 3, 5
7, 6 · 3, 4
BS (11, 10)
0, 0 · 11, 10 11, 10 · 0, 0
4, 4 · 7, 6 7, 6 · 4, 4
7, 7 · 4, 3 4, 3 · 7, 7
10, 10 · 1, 0 1, 0 · 10, 10
BS (12, 9)
0, 0 · 12, 9 12, 9 · 0, 0
4, 4 · 7, 5 7, 5 · 4, 4
7, 7 · 5, 2 5, 2 · 7, 7
9, 9 · 3, 0 3, 0 · 9, 9
Notes: The games pc(0, 0) and bs(1, 0) have different equilibrium features than standard pc
and bs games, respectively.
Table 10: Implemented simple, compound and Cartesian games (outcomes of the equilibrium AA
in each component game reported). The dot “·” stands for “+/×”.
4.2 The experiments
We have run two experiments, the experiment COMP that features the basic framing of a com-
pound game and the experiment PART that is intended to further emphasise this framing. The
emphasis is achieved by varying the amount of information subjects have when considering com-
ponent 1.
In COMP (COMPlete information) we implement simple and compound games.5 In this ex-
periment, the component games are presented on the screen at the same time (see figure 1). Players
have therefore complete information of the entire compound game when deciding which strategy
to select. Component 1 is always displayed at the top of the screen and component 2 at the bottom.
5In order to identify games in the experiment, the instructions employ a more transparent terminology: “linked”
allocations for compound games, “unlinked” allocations for Cartesian games, and “allocations” for simple games.
Instructions are reprinted in appendix A.1.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of compound game in experiment COMP.
In PART (PART ial information) we implement simple, compound and Cartesian games. In
this experiment, the framing of compound games is strengthened by presenting the component
games on the screen one after the other and by requiring a decision in component 1 to be made
before component 2 is shown.
(a) Screen 1 with component 1. (b) Screen 2 with components 1 and 2.
Figure 2: Screenshots of compound games in PART .
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In compound games, when the individual components are presented sequentially (see figure
2), decisions in component 1 are made under partial information, as payoffs of component 2 are
not yet displayed. Of course, players are allowed to change the strategy they have selected in
component 1 once they are presented with component 2. However, as players know that decisions
in component 1 are not binding, to minimise the risk of players not engaging with those choices,
PART also implements Cartesian games. Therefore, when facing a component 1, players do not
know whether that is the component 1 of a compound game, the component 1 of a Cartesian game,
or a simple game. They are informed of this after they select a strategy. Because of this uncertainty,
decisions in this component will be treated as binding with some probability, as players will not be
able to change it in Cartesian or simple games.6
To have a similar number of games in both experiments, PART features two treatments: PARTa
and PARTb. Each treatment features only half of the compound games in COMP with the remain-
ing half implemented as Cartesian games. The compound games in PARTa are implemented as
Cartesian games in PARTb, and vice versa. Component games are chosen so that in both PARTa
and PARTb there is an equally numerous representation of pc + pc, bs + bs, pc + bs, and bs + pc
for each simple game employed.
4.3 Procedures
The experiments were run in the AWI laboratory at the University of Heidelberg (Germany) in
July 2018. We recruited 148 subjects with the online system hRoot (Brock 2004): 46 subjects in
COMP and 102 subjects in PARTa and PARTb treatments. Upon arrival, subjects were handed the
experimental instructions that were read aloud by the experimenter. Subjects then answered a brief
questionnaire to check their understanding of the experiment. When all participants were ready
the experiment started. The order of the games was randomised across participants. Feedback
was only provided at the end for one randomly selected game that was then used to determine
the experimental earnings. In addition, subjects were given a participation fee of e 5. Average
earnings were about e 10.38.
5 Hypotheses
In this section we will derive hypotheses for our games using a combination of team reasoning
(Bacharach, 2006; Schelling, 1960; Sugden, 1995) and level-k thinking (Crawford et al., 2008).
Following Isoni et al. (2019), we will assume that players are capable of using both modes of
6Later on we provide evidence that indeed subjects’ behaviour in the first component of both compound and
Cartesian games does not significantly differ.
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reasoning, although only one at a time.
The simple games feature two players i = {1, 2} and two strategies s = {A, A}. Strategies
are uniquely labelled with one label per strategy, one of which is salient (A). By virtue of this
labelling, one strategy stands out. If players choose the same strategy, which is equivalent to
choosing the same label, their payoffs are piis ∈ {a, b} (with a ≥ b > 0) and zero otherwise. The
simple games are used to derive compound and Cartesian games. These games consist of two
component games c = {1, 2}, each with two strategies s(c) ∈ {A, A}. In compound games, players
are required to choose the same strategy in both component games. In Cartesian games, players
are not constrained in their strategy choice.
We say that two players team-reason if they independently look for a uniquely optimal rule
which, if followed by both players, maximises the chances of coordination leading to the best
possible outcome for the team. In coordination games in which labels are common knowledge the
best rule for the team is to choose the label salient strategy, i.e. s = A.
The version of the level-k model in Crawford et al. (2008) assumes that players differ in their
level of strategic sophistication. Level-0 players (L0) have a payoff bias, in that they choose, with
a probability p > 0.5, the strategies whose equilibria have a higher own-payoff. If both equilibria
have the same own-payoff, L0 choose according to label salience with probability p > 0.5. Higher
levels anchor their beliefs on the behaviour of L0 and best-respond to players just one level below
theirs. L1 best-respond to L0, L2 to L1 and so on. The distribution of levels in the population is
exogenously given and L0 only exist in the mind of other players. L1 in a PC will therefore always
choose the label salient strategy s = A, as the probability of coordination is greater than one half.
All levels greater than L1 will best-respond by choosing the same strategy. In BS games, how
often the label salient strategy is chosen depends on the distribution of levels. For our purposes,
without making any further assumption, it suffices to say that s = A will be chosen less frequently
than in a PC game.
Following Isoni et al. (2019), let us define the probability that a player uses team-reasoning
as τ. The probability that a player uses level-k reasoning is κ = 1 − τ. If we consider the whole
population of players, this probability can be interpreted as a proportion.
We assume that the class of game, be it a simple or a component game, influences these prob-
abilities. For a PC game, where a = b, experimental evidence suggests that team reasoning is
more prevalent than level-k reasoning, therefore τPC > κPC. By contrast, level-k thinking is more
prevalent in BS games, therefore κBS > τBS (van Elten and Penczynski, 2020). We take this to
further imply that τPC > τBS .
Hypothesis 1 (Simple games) The frequency of choice of the salient strategies is greater in the
simple PC than in the simple BS games.
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We will derive predictions for the reasoning in the compound games with the help of three
assumptions, two specifying the determinants of the mode of reasoning and one specifying exactly
which game is reasoned about.
The first assumption spells out how the class of the component games (pc or bs) influence the
probability τ. By the virtue of being displayed on top of the screen in COMP and first in PART ,
we assume that component 1 has a stronger influence on the mode of reasoning than component 2.
Assumption 1 (Class of component game) The probability of the type of reasoning employed,
τ, is a function of the class of the pivotal component game. The pivotal component game is
component 1 with probabilities 0.5 < pCOMP < pPART = 1.
Parravano and Poulsen (2015) show that an increase in the PC payoffs leads to an increase in
coordination while a proportional increase in the payoffs of a BS does not lead to a significant
change in behaviour. By the nature of our decomposition of a given BS game, a higher payoff
in a pc component leaves unchanged the absolute difference between players’ payoffs in the bs
component. This difference therefore increases in relative terms – not in proportional terms – as
the pc payoff rises. Therefore, while we can reasonably expect that an increase in the pc payoffs
increases coordination, the behavioural effect of a change in the relative size of the bs payoffs
is not clear. For simplicity, we assume no effect of differently sliced decompositions. Thus, for
example, any compound game that combines component games of classes bs and pc in the same
order and that reduces to a BS (11, 10) game – be it (7, 6+4, 4) or (1, 0+10, 10) – leads to the same
expectations on the modes of reasoning. Our experiment is however designed to be able to falsify
this assumption.
Assumption 2 (Component game payoffs) For any two compound games with the same reduced
form game and with the same ordered classes of component games, different payoffs in the compo-
nent games do not have any effect on the mode of reasoning.
Assumption 3 asserts that subjects integrate the payoffs of the component games and reason
about the reduced game.7
Assumption 3 (Integration) The mode of reasoning is applied to the reduced compound game.
On the basis of these assumptions, the next two hypotheses spell out the most basic implications
of decomposing simple games into a compound game.
7Alternatively, one could assume that the reduced game determines the mode of reasoning. However, this would
lead to hypotheses that do not distinguish between any compound games derived from the same simple game. Assum-
ing that subjects do not integrate payoffs could be a valid alternative, but would require further assumptions about the
determination of the one action to be played in all component games.
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Hypothesis 2 (PC decomposition) Decomposing a PC game into pc + pc or bs + bs does not
change the frequency of choice of the salient strategy.
This prediction is driven by assumption 3 on integration, which is critical in bs + bs. The
modes of reasoning are determined by the pivotal component. Once players realise that pivotal
and non-pivotal components reduce to a simple PC, players will choose the salient strategy. This
is because, applied to the reduced PC, both modes of reasoning predict the same level of salient
strategy choices.
Hypothesis 3 (BS decomposition) In COMP, decomposing a BS game into bs + pc or pc + bs
increases the frequency of choice of the salient strategy. In PART, the frequency of salient choices
increases only in pc + bs but not otherwise.
In COMP, because the first component game is assumed to be more important for the mode
of reasoning, a pc component 1 leads to more frequent team reasoning and salient choices. A
bs component 1 leads to more level-k reasoning. However, even with a lower probability, the pc
component 2 can still influence modes of reasoning. For this reason, we expect the frequency of
salient strategy choices to be greater than in the simple BS . In PART , because component 2 does
not influence modes of reasoning, a bs component 1 implies the same behaviour as in a simple BS
game.
Hypothesis 4 (BS order) Decomposing a BS game into bs + pc leads to a lower frequency of
choice of the salient strategy than a pc + bs decomposition.
Compared to pc + bs, the bs component 1 in bs + pc makes team reasoning and thus salient
choices less frequent.
Hypothesis 5 (Cartesian games) In Cartesian games, the salient strategy is chosen in compo-
nents pc and bs as often as in simple PC and BS games, respectively.
In Cartesian games, players are not constrained to choose the same strategy in both component
games. These games are independent and – under assumption 2 on neutral effects of component
game payoffs – predictions in the individual component games pc and bs are the same as those in
the simple PC and BS games, respectively.
From the perspective of narrow bracketing, the relevance of the components for the mode of
reasoning can be viewed as the result of not viewing the compound game as a whole but paying
attention to individual components. According to our assumptions, this partial view only influences
the choice of mode of reasoning, which is in turn applied to the compound game in its reduced
form. Compared to COMP, experiment PART can be seen as a manipulation that prompts a
stronger narrow bracketing effect by displaying the component games one by one.
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6 Results
In a battle of the sexes game, whether a simple or a component one, we define player 1 (P1) as the
player whose payoff is higher in the focal point and player 2 (P2) as the other player. For the bs+bs
compound game, we let component 1 define P1. It follows that P1 has the lower own-payoff in the
focal point equilibrium in the second bs component game. The reverse is true for P2. We use the
same definitions of players in the Cartesian games.
6.1 The simple games
Table 11 shows that the choice frequency of the salient strategy is as expected significantly greater
in the PC game than in both BS games (McNemar test, on pooled COMP and PART data; p <
0.001 for PC vs. BS (11, 10), p < 0.001 for PC vs. BS (12, 9)). In the simple BS games, both
players choose less often the salient strategy, but the reduction is more pronounced for P2.
BS
Experiment Players PC (11, 10) (12, 9)
COMP All 0.826 0.630 0.478
P1 – 0.696 0.522
P2 – 0.565 0.435
PART All 0.843 0.608 0.647
P1 – 0.706 0.765
P2 – 0.510 0.529
Table 11: Fractions of salient strategy choices in the simple games PC and BS by experiment and
player type.
Result 1 (Simple Games) The choice frequency of the salient strategy is greater in PC than in the
two BS games.
6.2 Component game payoff size
In the derivation of the hypotheses, assumption 2 states that behaviour in compound games is not
influenced by the specific payoff size of each individual component. This assumption is directly
testable in our experiment, which features up to four different payoff decompositions per BS game.
As the assumption on payoff size is only critical in deriving the hypotheses in compound games
with both pc and bs components, we restrict our analysis to BS decompositions.
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COMP PART
All P1 P2 All P1 P2
pc payoff 0.031 0.041∗ 0.021 −0.027∗ −0.024 −0.031
(0.022) (0.023) (0.027) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
Period 0.003 0.006∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
bs + pc −0.021 −0.015 −0.028 −0.118∗∗∗ −0.020 −0.215∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.032) (0.045) (0.043)
BS (12, 9) −0.004 0.041 −0.049 0.039 0.069 0.010
(0.024) (0.041) (0.030) (0.053) (0.054) (0.070)
N 736 368 368 816 408 408
Notes: Logit regression with standard errors clustered at the subject level. The variable pc
payoff is categorised as follows: 1 = (0, 0); 2 = (4, 4), 3 = (7, 7), 4 = (10, 10) or (9, 9).
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01. N: Number of observations.
Table 12: The effect of the size of the pc payoffs on fractions of salient strategy choices.
Table 12 reports the results of a logit regression with clusters at the subject level. The dependent
variable is a binary variable that takes value one if the salient strategy is chosen and zero otherwise.
The independent variables are the size of the pc payoffs (“pc payoff”), “Period”, “bs + pc” which
takes value one if bs is either placed at the top of the screen in COMP or displayed first in PART
and zero otherwise, “BS (12, 9)” which takes value one if the compound game reduces to the simple
BS with payoffs (12,9) in the focal equilibrium and zero otherwise.
We estimate six models: three per experiment. “All” considers all the experiment’s data, “P1”
and “P2” only player 1 and player 2’s data, respectively. The estimated coefficient of “pc payoff”
is positive and marginally significant in COMP for P1 and negative and marginally significant in
PART for All. The order of the components is relevant in PART , and affects significantly only
the behaviour of P2; the next section will come back to this result. “Period” of play is weakly
significant in COMP for P1. Overall, these results do not show a systematic influence of the pc
payoff size and are thus supportive of our modelling assumption 2.
6.3 The compound games
Table 13 reports the proportion of salient strategy choices for all compound game types by exper-
iment and player type. Because our main concern is whether behaviour differs across these four
compound game types, we focus on averages without distinguishing whether they reduce to the
simple BS (12, 9) or to the simple BS (11, 10).
PC Decomposition. We expect behaviour in pc + pc and bs + bs not to differ from behaviour




AverageExperiment Players pc + pc bs + bs bs + pc pc + bs
COMP All 0.865 0.743 0.598 0.614 0.554
P1 – 0.783 0.723 0.728 0.609
P2 – 0.703 0.473 0.500 0.500
PART All 0.843 0.634 0.581 0.699 0.627
P1 – 0.778 0.730 0.750 0.735
P2 – 0.490 0.431 0.647 0.520
Notes: The column “Simple BS Average” shows the average fraction of salient strategy
choices in BS (11, 10) and BS (12, 9). In a BS game, P1 is the player whose payoff is higher
in the focal point. In bs + bs, P1 is identified in component 1.
Table 13: Fractions of label salient choices in the compound games by experiment and player type.
reasoning and level-k reasoning both predict a salient choice in PC. We find evidence in support of
this hypothesis only for the compound game pc + pc in both experiments (Wilcoxon signed-rank
test, p = 0.783 in COMP and p = 0.601 in PART ).8 Instead, for the bs+bs decomposition, we ob-
serve in both experiments a statistically significant reduction in salient strategy choices compared
to the simple PC (p = 0.064 in COMP and p < 0.001 in PART ).
Result 2 (PC decomposition) In both COMP and PART, the choice frequency of the salient strat-
egy is significantly lower in bs + bs than in PC.
This result suggests that players do not fully integrate outcomes, in contrast to assumption 3.
In COMP however, the fact that the frequency of salient strategy choices in bs + bs is significantly
greater than in BS (p = 0.015 in COMP and p = 0.081 in PART ), suggests that something akin
to partial integration is occurring. In PART , on the other hand, the sequential display seems to
prevent any kind of integration.
Note that the lower frequency of salient strategy choices in bs + bs compared to that in the
simple PC is mainly influenced by the behaviour of P2 and to a lesser extent by that of P1. This is
consistent with the assumption that component 1 has a stronger effect on behaviour than component
2 in both experiments but especially in PART . Because P2s have a lower own-payoff in the
focal point of component 1, they choose the salient strategy less often than the non-salient one.
Specifically, in PART , the salient strategy is chosen 49% of the times and this selection is changed
in the second bs only about 12% of the times, even when it becomes apparent that the compound
game reduces to a simple PC. This type of behaviour is compatible with some kind of decision
inertia, or behavioural spillovers, but it is also possible that once players are distracted by the
8Here and after, unless otherwise stated, all within-subject tests are Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
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conflict of interest in the first bs, attention to label salience is lost when the second bs is unveiled.
This result is consistent with narrow bracketing.
BS Decomposition. Table 13 shows that in COMP the mere decomposition of a BS into a
compound game featuring a pc component does lead to an increase, albeit not significant, in the
choice frequency of the salient strategy compared to the simple BS (p = 0.305 for bs + pc vs. BS ,
and p = 0.191 for pc + bs vs. BS ). In PART , only in pc + bs subjects choose this strategy more
frequently than in BS (p = 0.014). In the bs + pc decomposition this strategy is, in fact, chosen
less often (p = 0.055).
Result 3 (BS Decomposition) In COMP, the BS decomposition does not have a significant effect
on the frequency of salient strategy choices compared to a simple BS . In PART instead, we do find
that this frequency increases in the pc + bs decomposition and decreases in the bs + pc one.
The BS decomposition in COMP does not have the hypothesised significant effect of high-
lighting the common interests in coordination via the pc component. For this decomposition to be
effective, PART ’s stronger emphasis of the component 1 is needed. An implication of this finding,
consistent with the literature on focal points, is that the mere information, as in COMP, on the
presence of a bs component influences behaviour more than the knowledge of the presence of a
pc component. In PART ’s pc + bs, subjects’ stronger exposition to the pc component makes their
behaviour more in line with simple PC games.
BS Order. Hypothesis 4 states that, the order in which component games are presented, in-
fluences how often the salient strategy is chosen. We do find that this is indeed the case in both
experiments, but the effect is statistically significant only in PART (pc + bs vs. bs + pc, p = 0.694
in COMP and p < 0.001 in PART ).
Result 4 (BS Order) In PART, decomposing a BS game into bs + pc leads to a lower choice
frequency of salient strategy than it does in pc + bs. No difference is observed in COMP.
The difference in salient strategy choices between bs + pc and pc + bs is mainly driven by the
behaviour of subjects in the role of P2. P2s choose the salient strategy only 43% of the times when
the bs component is played before the pc one. Instead, they choose it significantly more when bs
is displayed afterwards (pc + bs vs. bs + pc, p = 0.539 for P1, p < 0.001 for P2).
6.4 First component game analysis
Some further insights into the reasoning process in compound games can be gained from the first
component game choices in experiment PART . Table 14 reports the proportion of compound game
choices that differ from the first task choice. This information illustrates the circumstances under
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Component 1→ Compound game pc + pc bs + bs bs + pc pc + bs
Non-salient→ Salient
All 0.023 0.134 0.059 0.081
P1 – 0.034 0.020 0.085
P2 – 0.293 0.125 0.076
Salient→ Non-salient
All 0.021 0.098 0.076 0.593
P1 – 0.294 0.200 0.392
P2 – 0.013 0.017 0.736
Notes: In a BS game, P1 is the player whose payoff is higher in the focal point. In bs + bs, P1 is identified
in component 1.
Table 14: Proportion of strategy switches out of all choices of the indicated compound game
strategy.
Three regularities are noteworthy. First, there is – as expected – little switching in the pc + pc
compound games. Second, compound games with a first bs component game feature low levels of
switching. The analysis by player shows that the predominant direction of switches differs between
players. This therefore illustrates why the coordination success is low in these compound games.
Given that the player identities derive from the bs component game, this is the likely source of
miscoordination. Finally, the last column shows high levels of switches in the pc + bs game to
the non-salient strategy. Out of all players choosing the non-salient strategy in this compound
game, 59.3% did so by switching away from the salient strategy in the first pc component game.
Overall, switches are in the direction of the non-salient strategy to such an extent that the choice
distributions between component 1 and compound game are significantly different (p < 0.001).
This evidence testifies to the fragility of salient choices once misaligned interests appear in the
bs component 2. As expected, this tendency is most pronounced for players 2 (73.6%), who are
disfavoured by the salient strategy in bs.
Experiment PART implements both Cartesian and compound games in order to make deci-
sions in the first component stochastically binding. Subjects should treat the first component of a
compound game as the first component of a Cartesian game in which the strategy selected, unlike
in compound games, cannot be changed when subjects face the second component. As evidenced
by Table 15, the proportions of salient strategy choice in both compound and Cartesian games are
very similar and their difference is not statistically significant. This provides evidence that our





Compound Games Cartesian games
P1 P2 P1 P2
bs 0.79 0.37 0.77 0.40
pc 0.80 0.84 0.84 0.83
Table 15: Proportion of salient strategy in the first component in PART .
6.5 The Cartesian games
Table 16 reports proportions of salient strategy choices in Cartesian games by game type and
component. These games feature only in PART and differ from compound games in that players’
actions are not constrained.
Both components of the Cartesian game pc × pc show choice frequencies of salient strategies
above 80%. In line with our predictions, these frequencies are not significantly different from those
observed in the simple PC game (p = 0.104 and p = 0.724 for PC vs. pc1 and pc2 respectively).
Similarly, the choice frequency in each individual component of bs×bs is not statistically different
from the average frequency observed in the simple BS games (p = 0.694 and p = 0.963 for
average BS vs. bs1 and bs2 respectively). These results are also supportive of assumption 2 on the
component game payoffs.
pc × pc bs × bs pc × bs bs × pc
Players pc1 pc2 bs1 bs2 pc1 bs2 bs1 pc2
All 0.807 0.846 0.578 0.598 0.853 0.603 0.591 0.716
P1 – – 0.791 0.464 0.868 0.779 0.750 0.804
P2 – – 0.366 0.732 0.838 0.426 0.431 0.627
Notes: pc1 and bs1 are the component games displayed first; pc2 and bs2 are the component
games displayed after.
Table 16: Proportion of salient strategy choices in Cartesian games by component game and player.
In both Cartesian games pc×bs and bs×pc, subjects choose significantly more often the salient
strategy in the pc component than in the bs one (p < 0.001). In addition, the choice frequency
in pc is significantly greater in pc × bs than in bs × pc (p < 0.001). This difference is mainly
driven by P2’s behaviour. When the pc component is displayed before the bs one, P2s choose
the salient strategy 83.8% of the times. When the pc component is displayed after the bs one, the
choice frequency drops to 62.7% (p < 0.001). As a consequence, the choice frequency in the pc
component is significantly different from that in the simple PC if the pc component is displayed
after the bs one but not vice versa (p < 0.001 for pc2 vs. PC in pc × bs and p = 0.233 for pc1
vs. PC in games and bs × pc).
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For both Cartesian games pc× bs and bs× pc, salient strategy choices in the bs component are
not significantly influenced by the displaying sequence (p = 0.491). Moreover, in line with our
predictions, the salient strategy in these components is chosen as frequently as in both BS games
(p = 0.285 for bs1 vs. BS and p = 0.963 for bs2 vs. BS ).
Result 5 (Cartesian games) The salient strategy is chosen as often in bs games as it is in the
simple BS games. In pc games the salient strategy is chosen as often as in the simple PC games
only when it is not displayed after a bs component.
6.6 Relevance of compound and Cartesian games
The results of our first application of compound games provide evidence of their relevance in
understanding behaviour. In particular, our experiment shows that game decompositions lead to
differences in behaviour that are influenced not only by whether the component games are inde-
pendent, as in Cartesian games, or linked, as in compound games, but also by the order in which
they are displayed.
Cartesian games provide evidence of stronger behavioural spillovers from a bs component to
a pc than from a pc to a bs one. This suggests that behaviour consistent with level-k reasoning is
more persistent than behaviour compatible with team reasoning. In other words, in this instance,
the collective mode of reasoning is more fragile than the individualistic one and hinders possible
learning transfers from the pc component to the bs one.
Compound games provide evidence of narrow bracketing in that a decomposition of a PC into
a bs+bs game leads to a decrease in salient strategy choices compared to a pc+ pc decomposition.
Although the two bs components reduce to a simple PC, once opposed motives are highlighted
by the first bs component, they cannot be reconciled by the second bs component. Although,
theoretically, players’ interests in a bs + bs compound game are aligned, behaviourally that game
is closer to a battle of the sexes game, seemingly because outcome integration is only partially
carried out. The sequential component display implemented in PART is not necessary for this
decomposition to alter behaviour, because this alteration is, to a lesser extent, also observed in
COMP.
Finally, our experiment shows that the sequential display implemented in PART increases the
influence of component 1 on behaviour at the expense of component 2, as if, once subjects engage
in the type of reasoning triggered by that first component, that reasoning or behaviour cannot be
forgotten but spills over to the second component.
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7 Discussion
The BS compound games in our study are examples of decompositions by motive. These com-
pound games can be formal representations of verbalised motives and can thus reflect the fram-
ing of a BS -type strategic interaction or of complex negotiations better than simple games. As
such, they can be language-independent tools that could be employed to study, for example, cross-
cultural differences in games and motives.
An advantage of this formal representation is its scrutiny of the relationship between games and
their verbal account. For example, the separation of a BS game into two motives clarifies the verbal
description’s failure to motivate the zero payoffs off the diagonal. For a complete verbalisation of
the BS normal form game, a third sentence and component should reflect that “all music turns
equally unenjoyable when consumed alone” as the preference for a composer is fundamentally
independent of the other’s action (see table 17).
B S B S B S B S
B 11, 10 0, 0
=
B 4, 4 0, 0
+
B 7, 6 7, 7
+
B 0, 0 −7, −7
S 0, 0 10, 11 S 0, 0 4, 4 S 6, 6 6, 7 S −6, −6 0, 0
Table 17: Decomposition of BS game into three components.
To the extent that they are representations of motives, compound games become useful diag-
nostic tools to assess the empirical strength of a motive. If, for example, the behaviour in simple
and associated compound games is different, the required payoff change in one component to
equate behaviour in the simple and the compound game is informative about the relative strength
attributed to the motives in the original simple game.
Decompositions by motive could lead to the definition of a finite set of behaviourally elemen-
tary component games. These component games would be irreducible to more elementary cogni-
tive motives, lead to shortest possible verbalisations, possibly invoke specific types of reasoning
as do pc and bs, and might simplify the game comprehension despite the presence of multiple
components. Beyond a set of motives, it is not difficult to think of decomposing games by player,
by strategies, by cell, or even randomly. All these decompositions could lead to further interesting
applications.
As one example, consider the compound Prisoner’s Dilemma game in table 18. This decom-
position is not by motive but by cell and isolates two elementary PD components: the Hi-Lo (hl)
component that identifies the benefits from cooperation and the off-diagonal bs component that
identifies the “temptation” from defection. Would such a decomposition increase cooperation?
The comparison of a simple game and an associated compound game is independent of utility
specifications because the payoff consequences of the compound game are identical to the ones of
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Cooperate Defect C D C D
Cooperate 4, 4 1, 5
=
C 4, 4 0, 0
+
C 0, 0 1, 5
Defect 5, 1 2, 2 D 0, 0 2, 2 D 5, 1 0, 0
Table 18: Decomposition of PD into hl + bs.
the simple game. Only when the payoff integration is incomplete, the precise utility functions – be
they classic or reference-dependent – and the kind of utility aggregation become relevant.
In contrast to Cartesian games, important properties of component games such as dominance-
solvability and Nash equilibria do not necessarily find analogues in the reduced form of a com-
pound game. Take the decomposition of a Hi-Lo coordination game in table 19. Iterated deletion
of dominated strategies leads to the same strategy pair (A, A) in both component games, but is not
applicable in the reduced game. In compound games, the defining requirement to play the same
strategy across components allows players to exchange binding commitments to strategy B, despite
it being a dominated strategy for each player in one component game.9
A B A B A B
A 4, 4 0, 0
=
A 2, 2 0, 0
+
A 2, 2 0, 0
B 0, 0 5, 5 B 0, 0 -1, 6 B 0, 0 6, -1
Table 19: Decomposition of HL.
We do not implement standard Cartesian games in COMP as our objective is to investigate the
behavioural relevance of compound games. Cartesian games are instrumental to the achievement
of this objective in PART . However, our results show that, in fact, these games offer some unique
insights into behaviour that are complementary to those offered by compound games. As such,
they should be object of further investigations either on their own or in conjunction with compound
games.
8 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to introduce the concept of compound game and – with an application
informed by the literature on focal points – to investigate whether these games are behaviourally
meaningful. We find that salient choices are more frequent in a PC game than in its bs + bs
compound game and that separating a pc component in a BS game is effective only when the
pc component is displayed first. Furthermore, our results suggest that, for the decompositions
we employ, heuristics such as narrow bracketing and behavioural spillovers can help rationalise
observed behaviour.
9We are indebted to Bob Sugden for these considerations.
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We believe that the theoretical and experimental framework developed in this paper can be
further expanded to study behaviour in different contexts, to provide a formal analysis of verbal
descriptions of simple games, and to encompass different kinds of decompositions.
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Below are the instructions for both experiments COMP and PART .
The paragraphs that are experiment specific are enclosed in square
brackets, written in italics and preceded by the experiment in which
they appear.
Introduction
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. If you
follow the instructions and make appropriate decisions, you can earn
an appreciable amount of money. You will receive your earnings for
today’s session in cash before you leave the laboratory.
It is important that you remain silent and do not look at other
people’s work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any
kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave
and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
We will now describe the session in more detail. Please follow
along with these instructions as they are read aloud.
Everyone in the room is receiving exactly the same instructions.
Only experiment COMP:
[You will be presented with thirty (30) different scenarios, one
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after the other. Each scenario is an interaction between you and an
other person. Everyone in the room will make decisions in the same
30 scenarios.]
Only experiment PART :
[You will be presented with thirty-one (31) different scenarios, one
after the other. Each scenario is an interaction between you and an
other person. Everyone in the room will make decisions in the same
31 scenarios.]
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly pair
you with an other person in the room and one of the scenarios will
be randomly selected. The decisions that you and the other person
have made in this scenario determine how much money each of you
will be paid. Because you will not know which scenario will be
selected until you have made decisions in all of them, you should
treat each scenario as if it was the selected one. So, when thinking
about each scenario, remember that it could be the selected one and
think about it in isolation from the others. Your total earnings for
the session will be given by the earnings from the selected scenario,
plus a e 4 participation payment.
The scenarios
In each scenario you will face either one or two allocation tasks.
Only experiment PART : [You will only discover after you face the
first task whether there is going to be a second one.]
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Scenarios with one task In the scenario with one task you and the
other person will be asked to choose between two options, such as
the ones shown in Figure 1, by clicking on the button “Choose this
option” next to it. The options are the same for you and the other
person.
Figure 3: The Scenario with One Task
Options describe allocations of money between you and the other
person. One option will always be underlined while the other one
will not be underlined. Options will be identified in the same way for
both you and the other person. Consider Figure 1 as an example, if
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in your non-underlined option, you receive e c and the other person
receives e d, in the non-underlined option of the other person, you
also receive e c and the other person receives e d. The same holds
true for the underlined option. So, options that are highlighted in
the same way for you and the other person will also report identical
allocations between you and the other person.
It might happen that options feature identical allocations.
You receive e a and the other receives e a
You receive e a and the other receives e a
We will say that the two options however are different because
one is underlined and the other one is not.
While options are uniquely identified for both you and the other
person, their relative position (i.e. whether they are at the top or
at the bottom) is randomly decided by the computer in every sce-
nario. Some participants will have the underlined option at the top
and some at the bottom in some scenarios, and the opposite in some
others.
If you and the other person both choose the same option we will
say that there is a match.
If you and the other person choose different options, we will say
that there is a mismatch.
After you have made your choice, click on the button “OK” to
proceed to the next scenario.
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Scenario with two linked tasks
Task 1 in this scenario looks exactly the same as that of the sce-
nario with only one task (Figure 1). However, after you click on
the button “OK” in task 1, you and the other person with will be
presented with a second linked task (Figure 2).
Figure 4: The Scenario with Linked Tasks
In these scenarios, you and the other person will be asked to
choose one option from each task.
Let us call twins those options that, in both tasks, are either non-
underlined or underlined. In scenarios with linked tasks, you both
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will have to choose twins. You cannot choose, for example, the un-
derlined option in task 1 and the non-underlined option in task 2. If
you do not choose twins you will not be able to proceed to the next
scenario. If you were to click on the “OK” button despite this, a
pop-up dialog box will appear (see Figure 3).
Notice that the term twins identifies your options in both tasks
and is different from the term match. There is a match, in both
tasks, only if you and the other person choose the same twins (you
both choose the underlined options or you both choose the non-
underlined options) and a mismatch, in both tasks, if you and other
person choose different twins (you choose the underlined twins and
the other chooses the non-underlined twins, or vice-versa).
Figure 5: Not Choosing Twin Allocation in the Linked Tasks Scenario
Only experiment COMP:
[Given that decisions in both tasks are linked, you will be allowed
to change the option you selected in both tasks before you click on
the “OK” button. Once you leave a scenario, you will not be able to
go back to it to modify your choices. So, click on the “OK” button
only when you are sure those are the options you want to choose.]
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Only experiment PART :
[Given that decisions in both tasks are linked, you will be allowed
to change the option you selected in the first task when you are pre-
sented with the second one. Once you have chosen your preferred
twin options, click on the “OK” button to proceed to the next sce-
nario.]
Only experiment PART :
[Scenarios with two unlinked tasks
Task 1 in this scenario looks exactly the same as that in the sce-
nario with only one task (Figure 1) and in the scenario with linked
tasks (Figure 2). After you click on the “OK” button in task 1, you
and the other person will be presented with a second unlinked task
(Figure 4).
In these scenarios, you and the other person will be asked to
choose one option from each task.
The two tasks are unlinked in that your decision in the second
task is independent of your decision in the first task. That is, you can
choose whichever option you prefer in the second task independently
of which option you have chosen in the first task.
Given that decisions in both tasks are unlinked, you will NOT be
able to change the option you selected in the first task, once you are
presented with the second one.
Once you have chosen your preferred options, click on the “OK”
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Figure 6: The Scenario with Unlinked Tasks
button to proceed to the next scenario. Once you leave a scenario,
you will not be able to go back to it to modify your choices. So,
click on the “OK” button only when you are sure that those are the
options you want to choose.
What you will know about the scenarios
Each scenario will have at least one task and some will have two
tasks. You will only know whether the scenario involves two tasks
after you have made your decision in the first task. Then, if the
scenario has two tasks, you will also be told whether the tasks are
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linked or unlinked. Given the limited amount of information you
have on the type of scenario, you should always choose in the first
task as if your decision was final, as you might not be able to change
it if the scenario involves only one task or unlinked tasks.]
Earnings
When you have finished all 31 scenarios, you will be told which
of them was selected to determine your earnings. The decisions you
and the other person made in that scenario will determine how much
each of you will be paid. You will not be able to change your choices
at this stage.
The rules that determine your earnings in each task of that sce-
nario are:
o If there is a match you earn the amount(s) reported in the op-
tion(s). o If there is a mismatch you earn nothing.
In the scenarios with unlinked tasks, if there is a match in one
task and a mismatch in the other task, each of you will only earn
the amount reported in the matched allocations and nothing in the
other. In the scenarios with linked tasks instead there will be either
a match or a mismatch in both tasks, as in those scenarios you can
only choose twins. If there is a match each of you will earn the sum
of the amounts reported in the chosen allocations in both tasks. If
there is a mismatch each of you will earn nothing.
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